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INTRODUCTION

After more than two decades of vigorous debate, the original
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on September 16,
1938, and ushered in broad provisions for discovery.' The need for
discovery, however, was not a central theme of the debates that
preceded the original codification. 2 Rather, the proponents of the new
rules asserted that the Conformity Act of 18723 created uncertainty
regarding the procedure that would apply in federal court. This
uncertainty caused unnecessary expense and delay, particularly for
interstate corporations that felt compelled to retain specialized counsel
in every state.4 Proponents asserted that adoption of trans-substantive
rules of procedure in federal court would result in national procedural
uniformity, both horizontal and vertical, as states voluntarily adopted
similar rules for their own courts. 5 Since the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, most states have in fact adopted rules of
procedure that mimic the Federal Rules in large respects, including
expansive provisions for discovery. 6
This Article argues that the characteristics of federal and state
caseloads are so dramatically dissimilar today that national procedural
uniformity no longer makes sense, and may actually contribute to
inefficiency and unfairness. Since the enactment of the original Federal
Rules, the pursuit of procedural uniformity has become a virtual
mantra, repeated reflexively without serious consideration of its

1.
Stephen N. Subrin, FishingExpeditions Allowed: The HistoricalBackground of the 1938
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 691-93 (1998). The rules allowed, among other
things, a party to depose another party or witness outside of the presence of a court officer, to
request documents from a party or witness, and to pose written interrogatory questions to another
party regardless of the substantive claim asserted. Id. at 703, 705, 707, 718.
Id. at 693.
2.
3.
Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (requiring that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure conform "as near as may be" with the rules of the state in which the
federal court was located).
4.
Subrin, supra note 1, at 692-93.
Id. at 693.
5.
See PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR, ScoTT GRAVES & SHELLEY SPACEK MILLER, NAT'L CTR.
6.
FOR STATE COURTS, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 1 (2015),

http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Files/PDF/ResearchlCivilJusticeReport-2015.ashx [https://perma.cc/
CSP9-9SCE] [hereinafter LANDSCAPE STUDY] (explaining that "courts experimented with a variety
of procedural and administrative reforms to the civil justice system" after the adoption of rules of
civil procedure similar to the Federal Rules); Gregory E. Mize & Thomas A. Balmer, Rebuild Our
Courts, 101 JUDICATURE 17, 21 (2017) (criticizing the one-size-fits-all approach to the Federal
Rules that state courts have adopted). See generally Thomas Y. Allman, E-Discovery Standardsin
Federal and State Courts After the 2006 Federal Amendments, K&L GATES (May 3, 2012),
http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/files/2013/11/2012FedStateEDiscoveryRulesMay3.pdf
[https://perma.cclUH57-494L] (explaining how most states eventually adopted the salient
elements of the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules).
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continued viability or appropriateness. While we routinely accept
variations in state substantive laws, when it comes to procedure, we
hold allegiance to the notion of uniformity notwithstanding the fact that
state and federal caseloads are strikingly dissimilar. These
dissimilarities begin with the volume of cases filed. State courts
shoulder the lion's share of litigation in this country, with an estimated
seventeen million civil cases filed in state courts annually as compared
to roughly 250,000 filed in federal court.' A large proportion of the cases
filed in state court involve relatively low-value disputes involving few
contested issues and at least one unrepresented party.8 Civil cases filed
in federal court, on the other hand, include a large proportion of
geographically dispersed, complex cases that are navigated by
sophisticated lawyers on both sides of the dispute.9 With these glaring
differences, it is hard to imagine a single set of rules meeting the
disparate demands imposed by these caseloads.
Even if a single set of rules could address the demands of state
and federal caseloads, an unbending commitment to uniformity would
discourage the use of innovative procedures to address particular
segments of a caseload. Recognizing the power of procedure unshackled
by the demands of uniformity, a number of states have adopted
enhanced procedural requirements for debt collection cases in response
to the abundant evidence of unsavory litigation practices in these
cases.10 These efforts are hindered, however, by the relentless pursuit
of uniformity. If our goal is to achieve fairness and justice in civil
litigation, we must acknowledge that a one-size-fits-all procedural
system may not be the optimal approach. Proportionality presents an
opportunity to recognize the very different demands imposed by civil
caseloads in state and federal courts and to tailor rules that meet those
demands head on.
The concept of proportionality is not new. It made its debut in
1983 amid high hopes that it would "deal with the problem of over
discovery."" Since 1983, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules

7.
LANDSCAPE STUDY, supra note 6, at 6 (estimating that 16.9 million civil cases were filed
in state court in 2013 compared to 259,489 civil case filings in federal court in 2013).
8.
See id. at 31-33 (estimating that 75% of civil cases in state court involved at least one
unrepresented party).
9.
See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
10. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.58 (West 2018) (imposing pleading requirements for action
brought by a debt buyer); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 11019 (2018) (illustrating one such
procedural rule as requiring the debt buyer to attach a copy of the contract and a copy of the bill
of sale); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-70-155 (West 2018) (detailing the business records required to
bring a debt action).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment; see also Edward D.
Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:A Critical
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of Civil Procedure has revisited the concept on more than one occasion,
incorporating minor edits to the language and relocating the provision
to different spots within Rule 26.12 Unfortunately, each of these minor
tweaks has suffered from the same fatal flaw-namely, the lack of a
clearly identified problem.13 The Advisory Committee's notes express
frustration that proportionality has not had its desired effect, yet
empirical evidence suggests that lawyers in many federal court cases
believe that the right amount of discovery is exchanged at the right
cost.1 4 If there is a problem with proportionality in federal court, the

evidence suggests that it lies in a relatively small proportion of cases.1 5
Even if the evidence suggests proportionality is achieved in a
substantial majority of federal cases, 16 state courts should use caution
in blindly following suit. Although states have historically tended to
follow the lead of the Federal Rules, proportionality presents an
opportunity for states to advance the pursuit of civil justice by charting
a course that is tailored to the demands of their own caseloads.
This Article evaluates different paths toward proportional
discovery. As a foundation for analysis, Part I describes the landscape
of civil litigation in federal and state courts. Part II analyzes
proportionality in federal court, first by recognizing the unique history
of Rule 26 and then by evaluating three hypotheses that highlight
common criticisms of proportionality in federal court. Part III explores
proportionality in state court, acknowledges the distinguishing
characteristics of state civil caseloads, and defines proportionality in
light of these characteristics.
I. LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION

A. Civil Litigation in Federal Court
Approximately a quarter of a million original proceedings are
filed in federal court annually.1 7 The filings assert substantively diverse
Evaluation and a Proposalfor More Effective Discovery Through Local Rules, 30 VILL. L. REV. 767,
787-88 (1985) (discussing amendment to Rule 26(b)(1)).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 52-62.
13. Indeed, even the Advisory Committee has recognized that the repeated tinkering may be
contributing to the problem. See infra text accompanying note 59 (noting that the 1993 amendment
may have created ambiguity regarding the intended meaning of the 1983 amendment).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 79-94.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 79-92.
17. A picture of the landscape of civil litigation in federal court is discernible from an
interactive database available at the Federal Judicial Center's ("FJC") website. The data is based
upon information reported to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts by all ninety-four federal
district courts. The description of salient characteristics of civil litigation in this Section derives
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prisoner,19 26% statutory regulation, 20 14% civil rights, 21 11% tort, 2 2 7%
contract, 23 5% intellectual property, 24 and 2% real property. 25 Antitrust,
immigration, shareholder, and bankruptcy suits each account for less
than 2% of federal filings. 26
An overwhelming majority of suits filed in federal court involve
representation by counsel for all parties. 27 The prevalence of counsel is
likely due to the high stakes and complexity of the cases. A study of
closed cases conducted by the Federal Judicial Center asked plaintiffs'
and defense attorneys to estimate the stakes of civil litigation: the

from analysis of all original proceedings filed in federal court between May 1, 2016 and April 30,
2017. A search of this database indicates that 220,376 original proceedings were filed in federal
court during the period of May 1, 2016 through April 30, 2017. Integrated Database Civil 1988Present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb/interactive/IDB-civil-since- 1988 (last
visited Aug. 22, 2018) [https://perma.ccX3BY-QDV4] (check "1-original proceeding" in the Origin
box, select "Is between" in the File Date box, and input "5/1/2016" and "4/30/2017" in the File Date
fields).
18. The FJC database allows a user to search the "nature of a suit" using over one hundred
distinct codes. Id. (select the "Nature of Suit" box and scroll through the list to view all codes).
19. During the twelve-month period, 68,258 original proceedings were filed and categorized
prisoner suits. Id. (select "1-original proceeding" in the Origin box, select "Is between" in the File
Date box, input "5/1/2016" and "4/30/2017" in the File Date fields, and scroll through "Nature of
Suit" box and select codes 510-555).
20. During the twelve-month period, 58,325 original proceedings were filed and categorized
statutory suits. Id. (select codes 610-896).
21. During the twelve-month period, 31,180 original proceedings were filed and categorized
civil rights suits. Id. (select codes 440-446).
22. During the twelve-month period, 24,019 original proceedings were filed and categorized
tort suits. Id. (select codes 310-370).
23. During the twelve-month period, 14,847 original proceedings were filed and categorized
contract suits. Id. (select codes 110-196).
24. During the twelve-month period, 10,424 original proceedings were filed and categorized
intellectual property suits. Id. (select codes 820-840).
25. During the twelve-month period, 4,613 original proceedings were filed and categorized
real property suits. Id. (select codes 210-290).
26. During the twelve-month period, 470 original proceedings were filed and categorized
antitrust suits, id. (select code 410); 3,207 original proceedings were filed and categorized
immigration and deportation suits, id. (select codes 460, 462, 463, and 465); 203 original
proceedings were filed and categorized shareholder suits, id. (select code 160); and 2,024 original
proceedings were filed and categorized bankruptcy suits, id. (select codes 422 and 423).
27. During the twelve-month period ending April 30, 2017, approximately 87% of all original
proceedings filed, excluding prisoner suits, report all parties are represented by counsel. Id. (select
"1-original proceeding" in the Origin box, select "Is between" in the File Date box, input "5/1/2016"
and "4/30/2017" in the File Date fields, select "0 - no Pro Se plaintiffs or defendants" in the Pro Se
box, and scroll through "Nature of Suit" box and select all codes except 510-555). Slightly more
than 80% of prisoner cases involve an unrepresented plaintiff. Id. (select "1-original proceeding"
in the Origin box, select '"s between" in the File Date box, input "5/1/2016" and "4/30/2017" in the
File Date fields, click "0 - no Pro Se plaintiffs or defendants" in the Pro Se box, and scroll through
"Nature of Suit" box and select codes 510-555).
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median estimate by plaintiffs' attorneys was $160,00028 and the median
estimate by defense attorneys was $200,000.29 A substantial component
of the federal civil caseload involves multidistrict litigation ("MDL"). As
of May 15, 2017, a total of 234 MDL dockets comprising 129,646 actions
were pending in fifty-two districts. 30 This staggering number of
geographically dispersed, complex cases represents approximately 35%
of the total number of pending civil cases in federal court. 31
Overall, the characteristics of federal civil litigation suggest that
sophisticated lawyers are navigating the discovery process to resolve
complex factual issues relating to substantively diverse, high stakes
claims. The scenario of civil litigation in state court is very different.
B. Civil Litigation in State Court
State courts shoulder approximately seventeen million new
filings annually. 32 These filings are dominated by lower-value contract
and small claims cases, 33 with nearly two-thirds of studied cases

28. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-BASED
CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/08/
2009),
(Oct.
42
RULES
CIVIL
ON
CivilRulesSurvey2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD4B-2C3U] [hereinafter 2009 CASE-BASED SURVEY]
(noting that the 10th percentile estimate by plaintiffs' attorneys was $15,000 and the 95th
percentile estimate was $4 million).
29. Id. (explaining that the 10th percentile estimate by defense attorneys was $15,000 and
the 95th percentile estimate was $5 million).
30.

U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT -DISTRIBUTION

OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS BY DISTRICT 6 (May 15, 2017), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/
[https://perma.cc/BFR6-NJA7]
jpml/files/PendingMDLDocketsByDistrict-May-15-2017.pdf
[hereinafter MDL STATISTICS REPORT].
31. As of September 30, 2016, the pending civil caseload was 361,566. U.S. DistrictCourtsCivil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending
September 30, 2015 and 2016, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data -tables/jbc_ 0930.2016.pdf (last visited Aug. 25,
2018) [https://perma.cc/4FPP-NC3Y]. The Joint Panel on Multidistrict Litigation reports that
31.61% of MDL Dockets involve between one and ten pending actions, 44.02% involve between
eleven and one hundred pending actions, 16.67% involve between 101 and 999 pending actions,
and 7.69% involve one thousand or more pending actions. See MDL STATISTICS REPORT, supra note
30.
32. LANDSCAPE STUDY, supra note 6, at 6 n.36. In 2015, the National Center for State Courts
completed a multijurisdictional study of civil caseloads in state courts. Id. at 14-16. The report
focused on all nondomestic civil cases disposed between July 1, 2012 and June 30, 2013 in ten
urban counties (the counties were chosen to reflect the variation in national court organizational
structures). Id. The dataset consisted of 925,344 cases, or approximately 5% of civil cases filed in
state courts nationally. Id.
33. Id. at 35.
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involving contract disputes (64%),34 followed by small claims (16%),35
other civil (9%),36 tort (7%),37 unknown case type (3%),38 and real
property (1%).39 High-value medical malpractice and product liability
claims make up less than 1% of all civil cases studied, and only 5% of
the tort caseloads. 40 The stakes in state court tend to be much lower
than the stakes in federal civil litigation, with the average value of all
cases studied reaching only $9,267.41 Contrary to common perceptions,
only 0.2% of judgments exceeded $500,000 and 0.1% exceeded $1
million. 42
Perhaps the most significant distinction between federal and
state civil caseloads is the representation status of litigants. Only 24%
of studied state court cases report both sides represented by counsel,
while a shocking 76% of studied cases report at least one unrepresented

34. The cases involving contract disputes are comprised primarily of debt collection (39%),
landlord/tenant (29%), and foreclosure (17%) cases. Id. at 19.
35. Small claims are disputes valued at $12,000 or less. See id. at 15 (summarizing all small
claims categories for each county). Variability across counties is present, particularly in classifying
contract and small claims actions. For example, in Marion County, Indiana, debt collectors appear
to be filing low-value debt collection cases in small claims court in order to take advantage of
streamlined procedure, evidenced by the fact that the proportion of contract cases is 8% (as
compared to the average of 64%) and the proportion of small claims cases is 82% (compared to the
average of 16% overall). Id. at 18. It is notable that the Marion County Small Claims Court has
been the subject of intense criticism regarding the handling of debt collection actions. See JOHN
DOERNER & DANIEL J. HALL, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MARION COUNTY, INDIANA, SMALL

CLAIMS COURTS FINAL REPORT 4 (July 2014), https://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/pubs-smclaimsncsc.pdf [https://perma.cc/A55R-PN9G] (stating that Marion County's debt collection practices
expose debt collectors to unnecessary liability); SMALL CLAIMS TASK FORCE, REPORT ON THE
MARION COUNTY SMALL CLAIMS COURTS 18-20 (May 1, 2012), https://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/

pubs-smclaims-rept-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/57PU-P4XQ] (providing recommendations for how
Marion County can reform their system).
36. This category includes agency appeals and civil claims related to domestic or criminal
actions. LANDSCAPE STUDY, supra note 6, at iv.

37. The tort claims are comprised primarily of automobile tort (40%) and personal
injury/property damage (20%) cases. Id. at 18-19.
38. Id. at 18.
39. Id. at 17-18.
40. Id. at 19. Interestingly, the composition of cases in the Landscape Study has changed
since 1992. The 1992 Civil Justice Survey of State Courts estimated the ratio of tort to contract
cases at 1:1. See id. at 7 ("Of more than 750,000 civil cases disposed in the 75 most populous
counties, [the 1992 Civil Justice Survey of State Courts] estimated that approximately half (49%)
alleged tort claims, 48 percent alleged contract claims, and two percent were real property
disputes."). The Landscape Study reported a 1:9 ratio in 2015. See id. at 18 (estimating that tort
cases composed 7% of the surveyed cases and contract cases composed 64% of the surveyed cases).
41. Id. at 24. Overall, the mean judgment among all cases studied was $9,267 with a 25th
percentile of $1,273 and a 75th percentile of $5,154. Id. By case type, the mean judgments were
$157,651 for real property; $64,761 for torts; $12,349 for other civil cases; $9,428 for contracts; and
$4,503 for small claims. Id. at 24-25.
42. Id. at 24 (357 cases exceeded $500,000 and 165 cases exceeded $1 million).
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party. 43 Interestingly, 92% of studied cases report plaintiffs represented
by an attorney but only 26% of cases report defendants represented by
an attorney. 44
These striking differences between federal and state civil
caseloads suggest that the demands for discovery, and the
corresponding risks of abuse, are likely to be very different in federal
and state courts. The next Part analyzes the federal experience with
proportionality in Rule 26 and evaluates what, if anything, has caused
the concept to falter, in reality or in perception.

II. PROPORTIONALITY IN FEDERAL COURT
Nearly thirty-five years after the Federal Rules incorporated the
concept of proportionality, the provision remains an enigma. A
memorandum written by the Chair of the Advisory Committee in 2014
conveys a sense of frustration surrounding the elusive nature of
proportionality:
[T]hree previous Civil Rules Committees in three different decades have reached the same
conclusion as the current Committee - that proportionality is an important and necessary
feature of civil litigation in federal courts. And yet one of the primary conclusions of
comments and surveys at the 2010 Duke Conference was that proportionality is still
lacking in too many cases. The previous amendments have not had their desired effect.
The Committee's purpose in returning the proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1) is to
make them an explicit component of the scope of discovery, requiring parties and courts
45
alike to consider them when pursuing discovery and resolving discovery disputes.

The premise that proportionality is an important and necessary
feature of civil litigation is not subject to serious debate. No one argues
that parties should be permitted to engage in disproportionate
discovery. But this bland premise is followed by the vague and
ambiguous conclusion that proportionality is "still lacking in too many
cases" and the previous amendments "have not had their desired

43. Id. at 31. As a rough benchmark, the 1992 Civil Justice Survey of State Courts reported
that 95% of cases report both sides were represented by counsel. Id. Both sides were represented
by counsel in 98% of tort cases, 94% of contract cases, and 93% of real property cases. Id.
44. Id. at 31-32. Among cases filed in general jurisdiction courts, the percentage of plaintiffs
represented by counsel has remained relatively constant since 1992 at 96%, but the percentage of
defendants represented by counsel has dropped from 97% in 1992 to 46% in 2013. Id. at 31.
Multiple hypotheses exist to explain this asymmetry, including a strategic choice to forego counsel
because: (1) the cost of legal representation exceeds the amount at stake, (2) the number of
contested factual issues is relatively small, or (3) the simplicity of the legal issues suggests counsel
is not necessary. Alternatively, the asymmetry may simply result from a lack of resources to afford
legal representation.
45. Memorandum from David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil
Procedure, to Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, at B-8
[https://perma.ccl7CQ7-LE7V]
(June 14, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18218/download
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Memorandum].
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effect." 46 To support this conclusion, the Advisory Committee
Memorandum cites seemingly contradictory data gleaned from studies
prepared in anticipation of a conference at Duke University School of
Law on May 10 and 11, 2010.47 While empirical data from closed cases

supports a conclusion that lawyers are satisfied with discovery in most
cases, 48 impressionistic data indicates widespread dissatisfaction with
discovery generally. 49 Even if one assumes some level of dissatisfaction
with discovery, the root cause of the dissatisfaction is unclear.5 0
Based upon this data, the decision in 2015 to return the
proportionality provision to its original location, where it apparently
had not been effective, is a head-scratching solution to an ill-defined
problem. If the previous amendments have "not had their desired
effect," 5 1 we need to know why. This Article seeks to determine what, if
anything, is hindering the pursuit of proportional discovery in federal
court. First, it reviews the series of amendments that have resulted in
the proportionality provision we know today. Second, it evaluates three
hypotheses to explain potential causes for the perception that
proportionality in Rule 26 has been ineffective. Third, it suggests a path
forward for analyzing and effectively identifying markers of

46. Id.
47. Id. at B-6 to B-7. At the request of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules sponsored the conference to explore the costs of
civil litigation, particularly discovery. In anticipation of the conference, studies were conducted by
the FJC, the American College of Trial Lawyers, the ABA Section of Litigation, the National
Employment Lawyers Association, and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal
System, among others.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
49. See Advisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 45, at B-6 to B-7 (summarizing the
dissatisfaction of plaintiffs' and defense lawyers); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining
the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 783 (2010) (noting that federal
civil procedure rulemakers repeatedly hear that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
adequately control discovery costs). The Advisory Committee Memorandum states that nearly half
of respondents in one member study believe "that discovery is abused in almost every case, with
responses being essentially the same for both plaintiff and defense lawyers." Advisory Committee
Memorandum, supra note 45, at B-6. Although this impressionistic data suggest that abuse is
rampant, it is unclear if there was a uniform definition of "abuse." Is every rule violation an "abuse"
of the process? If not, how do respondents distinguish between rule violations that are abusive and
rule violations that are not abusive? Suppose a lawyer invokes a rule aggressively but in a manner
that technically does not violate the rule. Is this abusive? These questions depend upon a
normative assessment that may vary from one respondent to another. If we assume that
respondents will tend to be critical of an adversary's conduct and forgiving of one's own conduct,
the impressionistic survey responses may indicate that lawyers are dissatisfied with their
adversaries' conduct in almost every case. It is important to remember that impressionistic surveys
are susceptible to well-known cognitive biases regarding availability and recall that magnify
problematic cases.
50. See Advisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 45, at B-6 to B-7 (hinting that a
potential cause of the problem is that judges fail to enforce the proportionality factors).
51. Id. at B-8.
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disproportional discovery, such that the problem can be addressed in a
targeted fashion.
A. The History of Proportionalityin Rule 26
In 1983, the proportionality provision debuted as part of Federal
of
Civil Procedure 26, defining the scope and limits of discovery:
Rule
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision (a) shall
be limited by the court if it determines that: ... (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome
or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant
52
to a motion under subdivision (c).

The accompanying Advisory Committee note explains that the new
provision was intended to "deal with the problem of over discovery" but
cautions against excessive reliance upon the amount in controversy to
define proportionality. 5 3 The Committee encouraged judges to consider
the significance of the substantive issues, as "measured in philosophic,
social, or institutional terms." 54
Ten years later, the 1993 Advisory Committee revisited the
proportionality provision, relocating it to a different subsection of Rule
26 and incorporating incidental edits to the text.5 5 The Advisory
52. Cavanagh, supra note 11, at 787-88 (discussing the amendment to Rule 26(b)(1)).
53. FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment:
The objective is to guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery by giving the
court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to matters that
are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry. The new sentence is intended to encourage
judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse. The
grounds mentioned in the amended rule for limiting discovery reflect the existing
practice of many courts in issuing protective orders under Rule 26(c). On the whole,
however, district judges have been reluctant to limit the use of the discovery devices.
(citations omitted).
54. Id.:
[Mlany cases in the public policy spheres, such as employment practices, free speech,
and other matters, may have importance far beyond the monetary amount involved.
The court must apply the standards in an even-handed manner that will prevent use of
discovery to wage a war of attrition or as a device to coerce a party, whether financially
weak or affluent.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment. The textual edits
replaced the unduly burdensome language with cost-benefit language and added a new factorthe relevance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues. After the amendment, the relocated
rule stated:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise permitted under
these rules and by any local rule shall be limited by the court if it determines
that: . . . (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.
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Committee's note explains that the purpose of the amendment was to
"provide the court with broader discretion to impose additional
restrictions on the scope and extent of discovery."5 6 In 2000, the
proportionality provision was revisited yet again in response to
sentiment that "courts have not implemented [the proportionality]
limitations with the vigor that was contemplated."5 7 To remedy the
perceived dissatisfaction, the Committee added what it referred to as
an "otherwise redundant cross-reference . . . to emphasize the need for
active judicial use of [the proportionality factors] to control excessive
discovery."58
Most recently, the 2015 Advisory Committee revisited
proportionality out of concern that the "clear focus of the 1983
provisions may have been softened, although inadvertently, by the
amendments made in 1993."59 Finding that "the previous amendments
have not had their desired effect,"60 the Committee moved the
proportionality provision back to its original location. After the 2015
amendment, Rule 26(b)(1) defines the scope of discovery to, once again,
include proportionality:
Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as
follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties'
relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs the likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not
61
be admissible into evidence to be discoverable.

FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (1993) (amended 2000).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment. Omitted from the note
is the source of the complaints.
58. Id.
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. The 1993 amendment
is not the only source of ambiguity that may have "softened" the focus of the proportionality
provision. In 2006, the Advisory Committee was concerned about the cost and delay associated
with electronically stored information ("ESI") and added a provision that partially mimics the
proportionality provisions. The Advisory Committee's note does not address how, if at all, these
ESI proportionality factors relate to the general proportionality provisions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26
advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment (failing to address the relationship between ESI
proportionality factors and general proportionality provisions).
60. Advisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 45, at B-8; see also Richard L. Marcus,
Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 163 (1999) (observing that proportionality standards are "something of a
dud"); Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is
Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 349-70 (2000) (analyzing case law that attempted to
implement previous proportionality amendments and detailing the differences in paper and
electronic evidence that were overlooked by the then-current rules).
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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The relocation was accompanied by textual edits that added
"relative access to relevant information" as a new factor and
reprioritized the list to emphasize that the importance of the litigation
is not measured exclusively by monetary value. 62
The history of proportionality in Rule 26 illustrates why it is
necessary to articulate the root of a perceived problem in order to
effectively address it. Failure to engage in analytical due diligence
results in trivial efforts untethered to any real problem. To chart a path
forward, it is necessary to understand the scope of the perceived
problem. The next Section analyzes three hypotheses that offer
potential explanations for the long-held perception that proportionality
has been ineffective since its original incorporation into the rules nearly
thirty-five years ago.
B. ProposedHypotheses
1. Hypothesis Number One: The Problem with Discovery Is That
Lawyers and Judges Routinely Ignore the Proportionality Factors
The Advisory Committee hinted at this hypothesis in 2000, when
it added an "otherwise redundant cross-reference ... to emphasize the
need for active judicial use of [the proportionality factors] to control
excessive discovery." 63 In 2015, the Committee invoked this hypothesis
again when it chose to move the provision back to its original location,
to make the factors "an explicit component of the scope of discovery,
requiring parties and courts alike to consider them when pursuing
discovery and resolving discovery disputes." 64 Empirical evidence,
however, does not support this hypothesis.
In 2008, the Chair of the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules requested that the Federal Judicial Center
design and administer a national, case-based survey of attorneys.66 The
survey was administered in May and June of 2009 to a large sample of
attorneys listed as counsel in civil cases terminated in the last quarter
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. The Advisory
Committee explained that "[t]his rearrangement adds prominence to the importance of the issues
and avoids any implication that the amount in controversy is the most important concern."
Advisory Committee Memorandum, supranote 45, at B-8.
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment.
64. Advisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 45, at B-8.
65. 2009 CASE-BASED SURVEY, supra note 28, at 5. The 2009 survey was designed to parallel
in key respects a 1997 survey conducted by the FJC. See THOMAS E. WILLGING, JOHN SHAPARD,
DONNA STIENSTRA & DEAN MILETICH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE,

PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE, at v (1997), https://www.fc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/
discovry.pdf [https://perma.cc/A57D-LPLH] (reporting survey responses of nearly 1,200 attorneys
nationwide regarding discovery rules).
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of 2008.66 Nearly half of the attorneys invited to participate
responded.6 7 According to the Case-Based Survey, the advocates and
judicial officers who participated in the closed cases that were studied
diligently shouldered the responsibilities imposed by Rule 26. Indeed,
the survey reports that more than 80% of plaintiffs' and defense
attorneys conferred with opposing counsel to plan for discovery;6 8 the
court formally adopted a discovery plan in over 70% of the cases; 69 a
judicial officer held a conference to plan for discovery in 45% of the
cases;7 0 and a judicial officer held a conference regarding matters
relating to discovery other than planning in 13% of the cases.7 1 This
evidence strongly suggests that the overwhelming majority of advocates
and judicial officers are well aware of the requirements of Rule 26, and
regularly comply with the demands imposed by the rule. Any
assumption that lawyers and judges are unaware of the proportionality
factors included within Rule 26 flies in the face of evidence showing
overwhelming compliance with many aspects of the Rule.
Of course, it is possible that judges and advocates are aware of
the proportionality factors but choose to ignore them nonetheless. The
checks and balances of our adversarial system, however, suggest that
this possibility is unlikely. There is no reason to think that if an
advocate strategically ignores the proportionality factors to achieve an
unfair advantage, her adversary will politely acquiesce to the conduct.
Indeed, the advocate on the receiving end of this strategy would be
expected to rely upon the proportionality factors to fight back on
overreaching discovery. If the parties cannot reach an agreement on the
right amount of discovery, at least one of the advocates would be
expected to take the battle to the judge. Judges have no direct stake in
the litigation and nothing to gain by ignoring the proportionality
factors. Even overburdened judges, who might be tempted to ignore
proportionality and allow discovery to proceed unabated, will hesitate
to do so knowing that appellate review looms as a backstop to redress
any failure of the system. Admittedly, the proportionality factors are

66. 2009 CASE-BASED SURVEY, supra note 28, at 5, 7 (noting that of the 2,371 total
respondents, 1,183 were attorneys representing plaintiffs and 1,188 were attorneys representing
defendants).
67. Id. at 5 (reporting that approximately 47% of attorneys invited to participate submitted
a response).
68. Id. at 7. Respondents were asked: "After the filing of the complaint and before the first
pretrial conference, did you or any attorney for your client confer with opposing counsel-by
telephone, correspondence, or in-person-to plan for discovery in the named case?" Id.
69. Id. at 12. Respondents were asked: "Did the court adopt a discovery plan?" Id.
70. Id. at 13. In approximately 45% of cases, the court imposed a limit on the time to complete
discovery. Id.
71. Id.
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inherently subjective, and judges must use discretion to interpret
proportional discovery in every case. This does not mean, however, that
an abuse of discretion occurs whenever a judge allows challenged
discovery to proceed. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is
only fair to assume that judges seek to interpret the subjective
proportionality factors in good faith.
Overall, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that
lawyers and judges are aware of the proportionality factors but choose
to ignore them.
2. Hypothesis Number Two: The Problem with Discovery Is That
Lawyers Use the Rules to Accomplish Strategic Goals That Are
Beyond the Purpose of Discovery (i.e., Abusive Discovery)
There are several ways that this might happen. When the cost
of serving a discovery request is small and the cost of responding to the
request is high, a requesting party may have an incentive to maximize
the amount of information requested in order to impose unnecessary
costs on her adversary. 72 Such cost externalization imposes pressure to
settle at a higher value than the case might otherwise be worth because
the avoided cost of discovery is inflated. 73 Even if cost externalization
does not technically violate a rule, it violates the spirit of the rules-the
system does not intend to allow discovery that is motivated by a desire
to impose unnecessary costs on the other side. 74 Agency costs also
provide an opportunity to game the system. When a party collects
information in response to a request, the responding party acts as an
agent for the requesting party.7 5 The responder possesses superior
information regarding the costs of the production and the strategic
impact of the information produced.7 6 Thus, when the responding party
makes determinations about which documents are responsive to a
request and which documents are not responsive, the agency
relationship inverts the adversarial obligations of the parties and tends

72. Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionalityin
Discovery, 50 GA. L. REV. 1093, 1096, 1104-05 (2016) (explaining that requesting parties
externalize the costs of discovery and thus lack incentives to control discovery costs).
73. Id. at 1106-07, 1106 n.43 (admitting the possibility that a case may settle soltly to avoid
disproportionate discovery costs).
74. Id. at 1107 (explaining that the risk of cost externalization is generally minimized when
the parties stand on equal footing with regard to access to information and resources because any
perceived abuse will be reciprocated in kind).
75. Id. at 1096, 1104.
76. Id.
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to misalign incentives.7 7 Sometimes, this misalignment results in the
production of fewer relevant documents (and/or greater numbers of
irrelevant documents) while increasing the potential for inflated costs
of production.7 8 While it is well known that these risks of abuse exist,
opinions can vary on how often abusive discovery occurs. Data from
randomly chosen closed cases is a valuable tool for evaluating this
hypothesis.
The empirical data generated by the Federal Judiciary
Committee ("FJC") Case-Based Survey suggest that these types of
behavior do not dominate discovery practice. The FJC Survey asked
respondents to rate the information generated in discovery in a
randomly chosen closed case using a seven-point scale, with one being
too little, four being just the right amount, and seven being too much. 79
A majority of plaintiffs' lawyers (56.6%) and defendants' lawyers
(66.8%) responded that discovery generated "the right amount of
information" in the closed case that was the subject of the survey.80
Additionally, nearly 60% of plaintiffs' and defense attorneys responded
that the ratio of discovery costs to stakes was "just right." 81 Overall,
lawyers were satisfied with both the quantity of information produced
in discovery and the cost of discovery in a substantial majority of cases.
While this does not rule out the possibility of strategic (mis)use of the
rules, it does suggest that such problems are not the norm.
Of course, not everyone was satisfied with discovery. Both
plaintiffs' and defense attorneys reported cases in which discovery
generated too much information or too little information. Possibly the
most important takeaway from the data is that plaintiffs' and defense
attorneys report a relatively small proportion of cases in which too
much information was generated in discovery. Indeed, 7% of plaintiffs'
attorneys and 11% of defense attorneys reported that discovery
generated too much information in the closed case that was the subject
of the survey. 82 When the Advisory Committee adopted amendments to
proportionality in 2015, it stated that proportionality is "still lacking in
too many cases" and the previous amendments "have not had their
desired effect." 83 Yet, if proportionality is concerned with unnecessary

77. See id. at 1105 ("[O]ne feature of our discovery system is cross-party agency costs, whose
misaligned incentives may be even stronger than those that exist in the well-studied agency
relationship between a lawyer and his client.").
78. Id.
79. 2009 CASE-BASED SURVEY, supra note 28, at 27.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 28.
82. Id. at 27.
83. Advisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 45, at B-8.
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costs associated with production of too much information in discovery,
this problem impacts roughly 10% of the civil docket, according to both
plaintiffs' and defense counsel in randomly chosen closed cases.8"
Plaintiffs' and defense attorneys report more cases that produce
too little information in discovery than cases that produce too much
information. Specifically, 36% of plaintiffs' lawyers and 22% of defense
lawyers report too little information was generated in discovery.8 5
While plaintiffs' lawyers report that discovery generates too little
information in five times as many cases as those that generate too much
discovery,8 6 even defense lawyers report nearly twice as many cases
that generate too little information as those that generate too much
information.8 7 One might expect a plaintiffs lawyer to report that too
little information was produced in discovery because the plaintiff bears
the burden of proof and may struggle to collect sufficient information to
meet that burden. What is curious is that defense lawyers corroborate
the sentiment in 22% of cases.8 8
Consider cases in which one adversary possesses far more
discoverable information than the other (so-called informational
asymmetry).8 9 This situation typically involves a plaintiff who requests
a substantial quantity of information from the defendant, and a
defendant who requests very little information from the plaintiff. 90
Presumably, cases involving asymmetrical discovery obligations where
the defendant produces virtually all of the information generated in
discovery do not account for the 22% of cases in which defense lawyers
report that too little information is generated in discovery. Rather, in
cases involving asymmetrical discovery obligations, defense lawyers are
more likely to report that discovery generated too much information

84. See 2009 CASE-BASED SURVEY, supra note 28, at 27 (reporting that 7% of plaintiffs'
attorneys and 11% of defense attorneys polled in a national survey believed that discovery had
generated too much information in their selected cases).
85. Id.
86. See id. (reporting that 36% of plaintiffs' attorneys responded that discovery generated too
little information and 7% of plaintiffs' attorneys responded that discovery generated too much
information).
87. See id. (reporting that 22.4% of defense attorneys responded that discovery generated too
little information and 10.9% of defense attorneys responded that discovery generated too much
information).
88. Id.
89. Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 72, at 1104-05.
90. See Karel Mazanec, Note, CappingE-Discovery Costs: A Hybrid Solution to E-Discovery
Abuse, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 631, 639 (2014) (noting that defendants typically have more
discoverable information than plaintiffs).
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(11%)91 or just the right amount of information (66.8%),92 but not too

little information. The most likely scenario is that the 22% of cases in
which defense attorneys report that discovery generated too little

information involve symmetrical discovery obligations. In this
situation, both sides seek roughly the same amount of information
through discovery. It would be reasonable to expect that in some of
these situations the defense attorney felt entitled to receive more

information than she actually received. If the 22% of cases in which
defense attorneys report discovery generated too little information
involve symmetrical discovery obligations, the risk of cost
externalization and agency costs is reduced because both sides stand on
roughly equal footing. 93 This suggests that of the 36% of cases in which
plaintiffs' attorneys report discovery generated too little information,
roughly 22% involve symmetrical discovery obligations, and roughly
14% represent asymmetrical discovery obligations. If the risk of abuse
is greatest in the context of asymmetrical discovery obligations, the risk
arises in a relatively small proportion of the overall civil caseload (i.e.,
14%).
Finally, plaintiffs' and defense attorneys consistently assessed
the cost of discovery relative to the stakes, with approximately onequarter of plaintiffs' attorneys (23%) and defense attorneys (27%)
reporting that the costs of discovery were too high in relation to the
stakes. 94 Interestingly, both plaintiffs' and defense lawyers report the
cost of litigation as too high even if discovery generated the right
amount of, or too little, information. Thus, it may be helpful to focus on
the costs of discovery disconnected from the quantity of information
produced to reduce dissatisfaction. For example, cost-saving measures
such as offering a hearing or phone call with the judge prior to filing a
formal discovery motion may reduce the number of discovery motions
filed and allow quicker resolution of discovery disputes.
Overall, this data suggests that discovery abuse is not rampant.
Rather, plaintiffs' and defense lawyers report that a substantial
majority of cases produce the right amount of information at the right
cost, that discovery more often generates too little information than too
much, and that costs associated with discovery are a problem in more
cases than the quantity of information generated.

91. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (noting that 10.9% of defendant attorneys
reported that discovery generated too much information).
92. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (noting that 66.8% of defendant attorneys
reported that discovery generated just the right amount of information).
93. Cf. Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 72, at 1096, 1104-05 (explaining the concepts of cost
externalization and agency costs produced by a responder-pays system).
94. 2009 CASE-BASED SURVEY, supra note 28, at 28.
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3. Hypothesis Number Three: Disproportionate Discovery Is
Pervasive
The Committee hinted at this hypothesis when it cited a member
survey administered by the ABA Section of Litigation and National
Employment Lawyers Association. This survey found that more than
80% of the respondents indicated that litigation costs are
disproportionate in small-value cases, and 40% of the respondents
indicated that litigation costs are disproportionate in large cases. 95 A
close look at the empirical evidence, however, casts doubt on this
hypothesis.
One way to evaluate proportionality is by considering the ratio
of discovery costs to the stakes in the litigation. To calculate this ratio,
the FJC asked attorneys to estimate discovery costs and stakes in closed
cases. 96 The FJC Case-Based Survey calculates a median ratio of
discovery costs to stakes of 1.6% (plaintiff lawyers) and 3.3% (defense
lawyers). 9 7 While the ratio is nearly zero at the 10th percentile for both
plaintiffs' and defense lawyers, the ratio jumps to 25% (plaintiff
lawyers) and 30% (defense lawyers) at the 95th percentile. 98 The FJC
Case-Based Survey notes that in a survey administered in 1997 the
data was similar. Indeed, the 1997 survey concluded that "the median
ratio of discovery costs to stakes was 3%, for both plaintiff and defense
attorneys, and that the 95th percentile was 32%, for both plaintiff and
defense attorneys." 99
This data is telling in large part for what it does not show:
change. The ratio of discovery costs to stakes remained relatively
constant from 1997 through 2008. Such evidence supports the
Committee's conclusion that amendments to Rule 26 have been
ineffective at changing the ratio of discovery costs to stakes, at least
during the decade between the two datasets. The evidence, however,
does not support the hypothesis that disproportional discovery is a
widespread problem that impacts all or nearly all of the civil caseload.
In half of the studied cases, plaintiffs' attorneys reported that discovery
costs represented less than or equal to 1.6% of the stakes in the
litigation, and defense attorneys reported that discovery costs
represented less than or equal to 3.3% of the stakes in the litigation. 100

95.
note 49,
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Advisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 45, at B-6; see also Lee & Willging, supra
at 774-75 (noting the same survey results).
2009 CASE-BASED SURVEY, supra note 28, at 43.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
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The best approach to reducing litigation costs is avoiding litigation in
the first place. When litigation is necessary, however, these ratios
support a conclusion that discovery costs are not excessive in at least
half of the studied cases. 101 This does not mean, however, that there is
no problem with disproportional discovery at all.
The data gathered by the FJC indicate that in 5% of the studied
cases, plaintiffs' attorneys reported discovery costs equal to or more
than 25% of the stakes of the litigation, and defense attorneys reported
discovery costs equal to or more than 30.5% of the stakes of the
litigation. 102 A normative judgment is necessary to acknowledge the
right ratio of discovery costs to stakes, but the survey responses provide
some guidance on this question. Respondents were asked to rate the
costs of discovery to the stakes of the litigation on a seven-point scale.
Scores of five to seven represent discovery costs that were "too much,"
scores of one to three represent discovery costs that were "too little,"
and a score of four represents "just the right amount." 103 For plaintiffs'
attorneys who reported "just the right amount," the median ratio of
discovery costs to stakes was 1.2%, and for defense attorneys who
reported "just the right amount," the median ratio of discovery costs to
stakes was 2.5%.104 These ratios are similar to the median ratios
reported by all attorneys,10 5 again suggesting that at least half of the
reported cases are likely within the range of what most lawyers perceive
to be "just the right amount" of discovery.
The data also reveal that for respondents who reported that
discovery costs were "too much" in relation to the stakes of the
litigation, the median ratio of discovery costs to stakes ranged from
3.4% to 5.2% for plaintiffs' attorneys and 5.7% to 10.9% for defense
attorneys. 106 While it is hard to precisely identify a normatively ideal
ratio of discovery costs to litigation stakes from this data, discovery
costs of 25% to 30% of litigation stakes (the 95th percentile of ratios
reported)10 7 appear well beyond the range that most respondents would
deem proportional. If we consider that roughly 25% of plaintiffs' and
defense lawyers reported that the costs of discovery were too high in

101. See Lee & Willging, supra note 49, at 770 (concluding that total litigation costs "do not
support the claim that the typical case in federal court has escalating costs").
102. 2009 CASE-BASED SURVEY, supra note 28, at 43.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id. (reporting that plaintiffs' attorneys reported a median ratio of 1.6% and defense
attorneys reported a median ratio of 3.3%).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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relation to the stakes, 108 we could loosely extrapolate from the data a
ratio of discovery costs to litigation stakes of 10% to 15% at the 75th
percentile.
Overall, the empirical data do not support the hypothesis that
disproportionate discovery occurs in all, or even nearly all, civil cases.
The data do support a hypothesis that disproportionate discovery occurs
in a segment of the civil docket and that repeated amendments to Rule
26 have been largely ineffective at changing the ratio of discovery costs
to litigation stakes (at least in the time period from 1997 through 2008).
Taking this data at face value, therefore, the next step should be to
identify the defining characteristics of the cases that have proven to be
problematic and use these characteristics to predict which cases in the
future are most likely to become problematic. With a clear articulation
of the problem, it will become much easier to identify the solution.
C. The Future of Proportionalityin Federal Court
The proportionality factors incorporated into Rule 26 provide
general guideposts to navigate the normative judgment that lies at the
heart of the question: How much discovery is too much? While there has
been much debate regarding the efficacy of these factors, 109 the evidence
suggests that lawyers, when asked about specific cases, believe that
most cases are generating the right amount of information at the right
cost.11 0 To the extent that discovery may be excessive in some cases,
evidence suggests that the focus should be on identifying cases where
the ratio of discovery costs to litigation stakes exceeds 10%. The
Advisory Committee Memorandum states that
[t]he [Duke] Conference concluded that federal civil litigation works reasonably wellmajor restructuring of the system is not needed. There was near-unanimous agreement,
however, that the disposition of civil actions could be improved by advancing cooperation

108. See id. at 28 (reporting that 23% of plaintiffs' attorneys and 27.2% of defense attorneys
believed discovery costs were too high relative to the stakes in the case).
109. JOHN G. ROBERTS, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1, 5 (2015),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
D6PH-GDD8] ("The amendments [to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] may not look like a big
deal at first glance, but they are."); Max Kennerly, A Plaintiffs Guide to Discovery Proportionality:
Part 1, LAW 360 (Aug. 14, 2017, 2:17 PM) https://www.1aw360.com/articles/953237/a-plaintiff-sguide-to-discovery-proportionality-part- 1 [https://perma.cc/4RVQ-HE97] (noting that "thousands
of articles and blog posts" discuss the impact of the 2015 proportionality amendments); Suja A.
Thomas, Opinion: Via Duke, CompaniesAre Shaping Discovery, LAW 360 (Nov. 4, 2015, 2:41 PM)
https://www.1aw360.com/articles/723092
[https://perma.ccl8XAZ-PLXS]
("Through funding,
corporations have successfully lobbied academics and judges to define [the] proportionality rule in
their favor.").
110. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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among parties, proportionality in the use of available procedures, and early judicial case
management.1 1 1

Like motherhood and apple pie, it is hard to argue with the bland
assertion that we should advance cooperation, proportionality, and
judicial case management. Indeed, one may ask: What could possibly be
wrong with encouraging judges to police proportionality more
stringently in all cases and at all times? The problem with such an
approach is that encouraging judges to become involved in the
normative judgment surrounding proportionality in all cases will only
increase costs, particularly if lawyers are already achieving
proportional discovery without judicial intervention. With a clearer idea
of where costs are ballooning, based upon empirical as opposed to
impressionistic evidence, we will be able to root out excess discovery
without imposing unnecessary and costly restrictions where the system
is functioning well.
On the heels of the 2015 amendments to Rule 26, the next step
should be collecting further empirical evidence to evaluate how the rule,
in its new location, is being applied. The Advisory Committee should
request that the FJC administer a third case-based survey, similar in
form and substance to the 1997 and 2008 surveys, but targeted at
identifying the characteristics that define the cases most likely to
involve disproportionate discovery. The survey will provide
comparative data over two decades to identify discovery trends,
corroborate (or contradict) conclusions from previous studies, and
evaluate potential deficiencies in the proportionality factors.
Technology exists to create an interactive survey that is capable
of diverting respondents who report a particular ratio of estimated
discovery costs to litigation stakes. If a respondent reports a discovery
ratio in excess of 10%, that respondent might be diverted to a particular
series of questions specifically focused on identifying key characteristics
that may predict a higher risk for disproportionate discovery. For
example, if we hypothesize that complexity increases the risk of
disproportionate discovery, an interactive survey might drill down into
the specific features of complexity that tend to be problematic. Indeed,
there are many characteristics that may contribute to litigation
complexity, including the legal or factual context of a dispute (consider
an intellectual property dispute that rests upon immature questions of
law and the analysis of advanced scientific theory), the logistics of the
litigation (consider a multidistrict mass tort involving millions of
geographically dispersed parties), or even challenging interpersonal

111.

Advisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 45, at B-2.
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relationships (such as a dispute involving an acrimonious business
relationship).
Historical data will illustrate when certain case characteristics,
either in isolation or in conjunction with other potential triggers (such
as resource or informational asymmetry between the parties), pose a
risk for disproportional discovery and support the development of
techniques to avoid or defuse a problem before it materializes. Indeed,
with knowledge of the potential signals that predict disproportionate
discovery, it may be possible to identify cases that possess these
characteristics and yet avoid the problem of disproportional discovery.
These outliers will provide valuable information for reducing the risk of
disproportional discovery in other cases. If these cases generate the
right amount of discovery at the right cost, we need to know why.
Finally, a new survey will provide an opportunity to gather data
on multidistrict litigation, a segment of the federal docket that was not
studied in either the 1997 or the 2009 FJC surveys. Multidistrict
litigation currently accounts for approximately 35% of the total number
of pending civil cases in federal court, suggesting that a complete and
accurate picture of discovery in federal court is impossible without data
relating to experience in MDL cases.

III. PROPORTIONALITY IN STATE COURTS
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were codified in 1938,
the proponents hoped that the rules would usher in nationwide
procedural uniformity. 112 During the ensuing decades, state rule
committees perceived that consistency was beneficial to litigants and
courts alike and they adopted state rules of civil procedure that largely
mirrored the Federal Rules. 113 Today, however, states are questioning
the wisdom of uniformity and are entertaining the notion of stepping
out of the shadows of the Federal Rules.1 14 From the volume of litigation
to the amount in controversy and the representational status of the
litigants, state courts face very different demands than their federal
counterparts. 1 15 Discovery presents an opportunity for state courts to
112. Subrin, supra note 1, at 693.
113. See LANDSCAPE STUDY, supra note 6, at 1 ("After the federal judiciary adopted uniform
rules of rules of civil procedure ... the vast majority of state courts followed suit, enacting states
rules of civil procedure that often mirrored the federal rules verbatim.").
114. Only a small number of states have adopted or considered adopting amendments inspired
by the 2015 federal amendments, including Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Utah. See Current Listing of States That Have Enacted EDiscovery Rules, K&L GATES, http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/promo/state-district-court-rules (last
visited Sept. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/F7PF-6MBP].
115. See supra text accompanying notes 32-44.
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adopt procedures that more closely align with the demands of their own
caseloads.
Reform of state rules of civil procedure must begin with
recognition that state courts shoulder the lion's share of civil litigation
in this country. 116 While federal judges are able to commit
individualized attention to case-specific discovery for a substantial
portion of their civil docket,' 1 7 it is unrealistic to expect state judges to
accomplish this Herculean task for a civil caseload that is
approximately sixty-eight times larger than the federal caseload. 118 The
path forward, therefore, depends upon efficient allocation of state
judicial resources to ensure that the right amount of discovery is
achieved in the wide variety of cases that comprise the staggering state
caseload. The answer to this resource allocation puzzle may rest upon
the recognition that some cases are more likely to achieve the right
amount of discovery without significant judicial intervention than
others.1 19 To the extent possible, effective resource allocation will
depend upon identification of characteristics that enable courts to
foretell the likely posture of a case at the time of filing. The Landscape
Study, undertaken by the National Center for State Courts, provides
valuable data to make this assessment.
The Landscape Study estimates that a substantial proportion of
civil cases filed in state court involve routine issues relating to liability
and damages, a limited need for discovery, and a modest amount in
controversy.1 20 These characteristics suggest that parties are likely to
seek to minimize costs on their own accord, in part because there is a
limited demand for information in the possession of the other side and
in part because of the obvious desire to keep costs below the amount in
controversy. A significantly smaller proportion of civil cases involve
complex factual disputes, sophisticated legal issues, and substantial
116. LANDSCAPE STUDY, supra note 6, at 6 n.36 ("In 2013, litigants filed approximately 16.9
million civil cases in state courts compared to 259,489 civil cases filed in U.S. District Courts.").
State courts shoulder approximately sixty-eight times the caseload of their federal counterparts.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
118. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
119. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE IMPROVEMENTS COMM., CALL TO

ACTION: ACHIEVING CIVIL JUSTICE FOR ALL 12 (2016), https://www.ncsc.org/-/media/microsites/
files/civil-justice/ncsc-cji-report-web.ashx [https://perma.c/9C5Y-SRWT] [hereinafter CALL TO
ACTION]:
[Uniform rules that apply to all civil cases are not optimally designed for most civil
cases. They provide too much process for the vast majority of cases .... And they
provide too little management for complex cases that comprise a small proportion of
civil caseloads, but which inevitably require a disproportionate amount of attention
from the court.
120. LANDSCAPE STUDY, supra note 6, at 35 (concluding that the majority of state court cases
are small-value contract disputes).
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amounts in controversy. 12 1 Judicial oversight is particularly important
in these cases because the demand for information in the possession of
an adversary is substantial, and fiscal restraint is less imperative
because a substantial amount is at stake in the litigation. Utah
presents a case study of how one state has structured its rules of civil
procedure in recognition of these insights.
A. The Utah Experience
In 2011, the Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Civil Procedure concluded that it no longer made sense for the
Utah Rules to mirror the Federal Rules, noting:
[I]t was perceived that consistency with the federal rules, along with the extensive case
law interpreting them, would provide a positive benefit ... [The Committee has come to
question the very premise on which Utah adopted those rules. The federal rules were
designed for complex cases with large amounts in controversy that typify the federal
system. The vast majority of cases filed in Utah courts are not those types of cases. As a
result, our state civil justice system has become unavailable for many people because they
cannot afford it. 122

The Utah Advisory Committee sought to address the problem by
requiring parties to disclose certain information without a discovery
request, 123 and assigning cases to one of three tiers defined according to
the amount in controversy. 124 Each tier imposes presumptive limits on
discovery, 125 but parties are allowed to stipulate to (or seek court
121. See id.
122. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, UTAH: IMPACT OF THE REVISIONS TO RULE 26 ON

DISCOVERY PRACTICE IN THE UTAH DISTRICT COURTS 1 (Apr. 2015), https://www.ncsc.org/-/medial
Files/PDF/Topics/Civil%20Procedure/Utah%2ORule%2026%2OEvaluation%2Final%2OReport(20
15).ashx [https://perma.cc/48Z3-S9FA] [hereinafter NCSC: UTAH IMPACT STUDY] (alterations in
original).
123. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (requiring the automatic disclosures of (A) the identity of
individuals who possess information that support the disclosing party's case; (B) documents,
electronically stored information, and tangible things that support the disclosing party's case; and
(C) a computation of damages).
124. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(c)(5). Tier 1 cases involve an amount in controversy of $50,000 or less
and presumptively allow five requests for admissions, five requests for production, and three
deposition hours (no interrogatories are presumptively allowed in Tier 1 cases). Id. Tier 2 cases
involve an amount in controversy of more than $50,000 but less than $300,000 and presumptively
allow ten interrogatories, ten requests for admissions, ten requests for production, and fifteen
deposition hours. Id. Tier 3 cases involve more than $300,000 and presumptively allow twenty
interrogatories, twenty requests for admission, twenty requests for production, and thirty
deposition hours. Id. Cases seeking nonmonetary relief are assigned to Tier 2 unless the request
for relief is accompanied by a damages claim for more than $300,000 (justifying a Tier 3
assignment). Id.
125. Admittedly, it is possible to steer a case into a higher tier by pleading an inflated amount
in controversy. The data showed some evidence of tier inflation between the pre-implementation
cases and the post-implementation cases. The data indicated the proportion of Tier 1 cases
decreased from 66% pre-implementation to 61% post-implementation, while the proportion of Tier
2 cases increased from 32% to 36%, and the proportion of Tier 3 cases increased from 1% to 3%.
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permission for) additional discovery. 126 Evidence suggests that these
changes have had a positive impact in Utah.
In April 2015, the National Center for State Courts completed
an empirical study of the short-term and long-term impacts of the
revisions to Utah Rule 26.127 The data showed an increase in the rate of
settlement across all three tiers (excluding debt collection and domestic
cases),1 28 and post-implementation cases reached a final disposition
29 Parties sought
more quickly than pre-implementation cases.1
additional discovery (above the presumptive limits) in only a small
percentage of cases,'13 0 and when additional discovery was requested, it
occurred most frequently in Tier 3 cases. 3 1 Litigated discovery disputes
increased by 1.2%,132 but most of this increase is attributable to Tier 1
debt collection cases in which consumer defendants sought additional
information about the details of the debt.1 33 From a normative
perspective, this may suggest that mandatory disclosures prompted
consumers to request additional information that they would not have
thought to request absent the disclosures. Beyond this category, the
data showed dramatic decreases in discovery disputes in all other

NCSC: UTAH IMPACT STUDY, supra note 122, at 10. To substantiate the suspicion of tier inflation,
the report found that the proportion of judgments less than $50,000 in Tier 2 cases increased from
31% in the pre-implementation cases to 48% in the post-implementation cases, and the proportion
of judgments between $50,000 and $300,000 decreased from 68% to 50%. Id. at 12.
126. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(c)(6) (necessitating that motions for extraordinary discovery
indicate whether parties have reviewed and approved discovery budgets).
127. NCSC: UTAH IMPACT STUDY, supra note 122. The study compared selected case
characteristics of all cases filed in Utah district courts between January 1, 2011 and June 30, 2011
(pre-implementation cases) and all cases filed in Utah district courts between January 1, 2012 and
June 30, 2012 (post-implementation cases). Id. at 5. The study was comprised of five components:
(1) trends in aggregate case filings, (2) case-level characteristics for cases filed before and after
implementation of the discovery reforms, (3) survey results from attorneys representing parties in
civil cases subject to the revised provisions of Rule 26, (4) judicial observations about the impact
of the changes obtained during focus groups, and (5) Civil Litigation Cost Model Survey results
from attorneys of record in civil cases filed after the amendments. Id. at 5-6.
128. Id. at 13-14 tbl.8 (demonstrating a 14% to 18% increase in the rate of settlement across
all three tiers). This suggests that necessary information is being exchanged to evaluate the merits
of the case and reach acceptable outcomes.
129. See id. at 14-21 (suggesting that new discovery rules may be encouraging earlier case
evaluation).
130. Id. at 22 tbl. 10. Contested motions for additional discovery were filed in 0.4% of cases,
and stipulations for additional discovery were filed in 0.9% of cases. Among the 130 motions and
stipulations seeking additional discovery, 85% sought to expand the scope of discovery and 15%
sought more time to comply with discovery. Id.
131. Id. When contested motions for additional discovery were filed, they were overwhelmingly
granted. Indeed, of the sixty-four court orders entered in response to requests for additional
discovery, only four orders denied the motion or disapproved the stipulation. Id.
132. Id. at 24 tbl.13.
133. Id. Discovery disputes in Tier 1 debt collection cases increased from 2.2% in preimplementation cases to 5.6% in post-implementation. Id.
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categories. 134 When discovery disputes occurred, they tended to be
earlier in the litigation. 135 The amendments had little impact on the
overall proportion of cases involving pro se litigants. 136 Some
interesting changes, however, were detected within the tiers.
Specifically, the proportion of Tier 1 non-debt collection cases where
both parties were represented by counsel increased nearly 20%,137 and
the proportion of Tier 2 nondomestic cases in which both parties were
represented by counsel increased 12%.138
Overall, the evidence suggests that the Utah initiatives had a
positive effect in the state. The next question is: Can these results be
replicated more broadly?
B. The Civil Justice Initiative
In 2013, the Conference of Chief Justices created a special committee,
the Civil Justice Improvements ("CJI") Committee, and charged the
committee with "developing guidelines and best practices for civil
litigation based upon evidence derived from state pilot projects and
from other applicable research, and informed by implemented rule
changes and stakeholder input. . . ."139 After nearly two years of study,
the CJI Committee presented a detailed report to the Conference of

134. Id. at 24-25. Disputes in Tier 1 non-debt collection cases fell from 6.2% to 1.7%, disputes
in Tier 2 nondomestic cases fell from 10.2% to 8.3%, and disputes in Tier 3 cases fell from 18.3%
to 10.9%. Id.
135. Id. at 25. On average, discovery disputes in post-implementation cases took place four
months earlier in the life of the case than in pre-implementation cases. Id.
136. Id. at 26. Both parties were represented by counsel in 26% of all civil cases in the preimplementation group and 26% in the post-implementation group. Id. Moreover, almost no
difference was detected in the pre- and post-implementation categories for the proportion of cases
where plaintiff was represented and defendant was pro se (60% pre-implementation and 58% postimplementation), for the proportion of case where plaintiff was pro se and defendant was
represented (5% pre-implementation and 6% post-implementation), or for the proportion of cases
where both parties are pro se (10% pre-implementation and 11% post-implementation). Id.
137. Id. at 27. Tier 1 non-debt collection cases where both parties were represented by counsel
increased from 42% in pre-implementation cases to 61% in post-implementation cases. Id.
138. Id. Tier 2 nondomestic cases in which both parties were represented by counsel increased
from 60% in pre-implementation cases to 72% in post-implementation cases. Id.
139. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, RESOLUTION 5, at 2 (Jan. 30, 2013),
https://ccj.ncsc.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CCJ/Resolutions/01302013-Civil-LitigationEstablish-Committee-Charged-with-Developing-Guidelines.ashx
[https://perma.cc/79X7-HAY7];
see also CALL TO ACTION, supra note 119, at 5 (explaining the role of the Civil Justice
Improvements ("CJr') Committee). The Conference of Chief Justices named the twenty-three
member committee, chaired by the Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, Thomas Balmer.
The members included trial and appellate court judges; court administrators; experienced civil
lawyers representing the plaintiff, defense, and legal aid bars; representatives of corporate legal
departments; and legal academics. CALL TO ACTION, supranote 119, at 5. The author of this Article
was a member of the CJI Committee.
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Chief Justices, recommending a mandatory pathway-assignment
system. 140
The first pathway, referred to as the streamlined pathway, is
intended for cases requiring minimal judicial intervention. 141 Based
upon data included in the Landscape Study, the CJI Committee
estimates that approximately 85% of all civil cases fit the criteria for
this pathway.1 42 In streamlined cases, both sides of the dispute will
likely know most of the information relevant to claims and defenses,
suggesting that mandatory disclosures supplemented by limited
traditional discovery will be sufficient.1 43 With a showing of good cause,
additional discovery will be permitted in streamlined cases.1 44
On the other end of the spectrum, a complex pathway is intended
for cases that are likely to require close court supervision.1 45
Approximately 3% or fewer of all civil cases will meet the criteria for
assignment to a complex pathway.1 46 The defining feature of the
complex pathway is a need for customized case management that
begins with a mandatory initial case-management conference to
develop a detailed discovery plan for the particular needs of the case.1 47
In between the streamlined and complex pathways is the
general pathway.1 48 This pathway will absorb the cases that are not
140. See CALL TO ACTION, supra note 119, at 7, 13 (explaining the need for a pathway
assignment system).
141. Id. at 21-22 (detailing the advantages of establishing streamlined pathway for relatively
uncomplicated cases). Streamlined cases are defined as "those with a limited number of parties,
routine issues related to liability and damages, few anticipated pretrial motions, limited need for
discovery, few witnesses, minimal documentary evidence and anticipated trial length of one to two
days." Id. at 21.
142. Id. The case types most likely to possess these characteristics include: "automobile tort,
intentional tort, premises liability, tort-other, certain insurance coverage claims, landlord/tenant,
buyer plaintiff, seller plaintiff, consumer debt, other contract, and appeals from small claims." Id.
143. See id. at 22 ("Thus, streamlined rules should include presumptive discovery limits,
because such limits build in proportionality. Where additional information is needed to make
decisions about trial or settlement, the parties can obtain additional discovery with a showing of
good cause.").
144. Id.
145. See id. at 23 ("The Complex Pathway provides right-sized process for those cases
that ... may be legally complex or logistically complicated, or ... may involve complex evidence,
numerous witnesses, and/or high interpersonal conflict.").
146. Id. ("Cases in this pathway include multi-party medical malpractice, class actions,
antitrust, multi-party commercial cases, securities, environmental torts, construction defect,
product liability, and mass torts.").
147. Id. at 24.
148. Id. at 26:
The General Pathway provides the right amount of process for the cases that are not
simple, but also are not complex. Thus, General Pathway cases are those cases that are
principally identified by what they are not, as they do not fit into either the Streamlined
Pathway or the Complex Pathway. Nevertheless, the General Pathway is not another
route to "litigation as we know it."
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captured by either of the other two pathways, and it is likely to account
for approximately 12% of civil cases filed. 149 This pathway recommends
mandatory initial disclosures followed by tailored additional discovery
as determined by a judge based upon the needs of the case. 150
The Conference of Chief Justices officially endorsed the CJI
Recommendations in July 2016,151 and encouraged state courts to study
and evaluate the recommendations for implementation.
C. The Future of Proportionalityin State Courts
While the characteristics of civil caseloads are likely to vary from
state to state in important ways, the Landscape Study and the CJI
Recommendations present compelling evidence that the basic
characteristics of civil litigation in state courts are quite dissimilar from
the characteristics of civil litigation in federal court. 152 This fact alone
suggests that states would be well served to step out of the shadow of
the Federal Rules and adopt rules that aim to address the demands of
their own caseloads. In addition to the commonsense appeal of this
assertion, there are several additional reasons that states should reject
the federal proportionality factors.
The subjective proportionality factors incorporated in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26 are not suited to the majority of civil cases
filed in state courts, in large part because fewer litigants are
represented in state court. Federal civil litigation overwhelmingly
involves zealous advocates on both sides of a dispute, who are well
equipped to wrangle over the proportionality factors. In turn, the
proportionality factors support the normative judgments that inform
how much discovery is too much (or not enough), in light of the complex
demands of federal cases and a substantial amount in controversy.15 3
While the federal Advisory Committee has repeatedly expressed
frustration with the efficacy of the proportionality concept in federal
court, there is little doubt that trained advocates on both sides of a
dispute are more likely to achieve a fair outcome on these normative

149. See id. at 21, 23 (estimating that the streamlined pathway would account for 85% of all
cases and the complex pathway would account for 3% of all cases, leaving 12% of all cases to the
general pathway).
150. See id. at 26-27 (advocating that courts should require mandatory disclosures and
tailored additional discovery rather than relying upon presumptive discovery limits).
151. CONFERENCE

OF

CHIEF

JUSTICES,

RESOLUTION

8,

at

2

(July

27,

2016),

https://ccj.ncsc.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CCJ/Resolutions/07272016-Support-Call-ActionRecommendations-CJI.ashx [https://perma.cc/4Y99-Z4Y4].
152. States should consider supplementing the Landscape Study with state-specific studies to
allow states to tailor rules to the particular needs of their own caseload.
153. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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judgments than a trained advocate sparring with an unrepresented
party. Moreover, data from the Landscape Study suggest that plaintiffs
are overwhelmingly represented by counsel and defendants are
overwhelmingly pro se. 154 In this situation, even if an unrepresented
party does not want to invest time and effort to interpret vague
proportionality factors in cases that involve low-value disputes and few
contested facts, plaintiffs' counsel may use the rules of discovery to
externalize costs to increase the settlement value of a case by asking for
more discovery than is necessary. Clearly articulated parameters for
discovery in cases that demand little discovery and involve modest
stakes will protect all parties, particularly those who are
unrepresented, from unfairness and potential abuse.
Moreover, consistency with the Federal Rules is unlikely to
produce benefits of efficiency because of the sui generis nature of the
proportionality analysis. The proportionality factors are based upon
subjective criteria that apply to a wide swath of cases involving very
different facts and circumstances. Normative judgments that sculpt the
parameters of discovery in a particular case are likely to be unique to
those facts. As such, the development of a deep body of federal case law
that is helpful to state court judges is unlikely. States should not adopt
the proportionality factors in Rule 26 with the belief that consistency
with the Federal Rules will increase efficiency for state courts or their
litigants.
Nor should states be tempted by administrative convenience to
adopt the federal proportionality standard. The history of
proportionality in Rule 26 illustrates the frustration and uncertainty
that has surrounded the proportionality concept in federal court over
the last thirty-five years. 155 Rather than continuing to follow each twist
and turn of proportionality in the Federal Rules, states have a viable
alternative that has been studied and vetted by a deep and wide variety
of stakeholders. The CJI Recommendations are tailored to the
characteristics of state caseloads and supported by empirical evidence
derived from pilot projects administered in state courts around the
country. While consistency between state and federal civil rules may
have made sense in 1938, today states should seize the opportunity to
advance their own local policy preferences by adopting rules of
procedure that advance the concept of proportional discovery in light of
the particular demands of their own civil caseloads. Over time, easing
the commitment to uniform rules of procedure will encourage states to
use procedure innovatively even beyond discovery. Jurisdictions will
154. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 52-62.
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learn from each other and successes (as well as failures) will inform
future developments.
CONCLUSION

While states have nibbled at the edges of uniformity to address
discrete problems, this Article argues that the time has come to unleash
procedure from the constraints of uniformity and address the disparate
demands of civil caseloads in federal and state courts head on.
Proportionality presents an opportunity to begin this process. Empirical
evidence suggests that in many federal court cases, lawyers believe that
the right amount of discovery is exchanged at the right cost. If there is
a problem with proportionality in federal court, the evidence suggests
that it lies in a relatively small proportion of cases. Notwithstanding
this evidence, state courts should use caution in blindly following the
Federal Rules on proportionality. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests
that civil caseloads in state courts are very dissimilar to civil caseloads
in federal court, suggesting that a one-size-fits-all approach to
proportionality is likely not the best approach. Freeing states from the
binds of uniformity may, over time, encourage even broader procedural
innovations. As states move away from the Federal Rules template, the
rules of civil procedure in each jurisdiction will begin to reflect policy
goals and priorities that are most important to the citizens of the state,
just as state substantive laws have always done. Uniformity may suffer,
but fairness and justice will likely flourish.

